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Abstract
This paper models the role of the lender of last resort (LoLR) in a general equilibrium framework.
We allow for heterogeneous agents and a risk-averse banking sector, and incorporate the frictions
of endogenous default, liquidity, and money. Adverse supply shocks in monetary endowments trig-
ger default, leading to deterioration in the value of bank assets, and subsequent bank illiquidity
in some states of the world. LoLR intervention is then assessed with regards to its economy-wide
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for constructive ambiguity and the ‘too big to fail’ problem.
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1 Introduction
The concept of the lender of last resort (LoLR) traces its origins to the works of Henry Thorn-
ton (1802) and Walter Bagehot (1873) who outlined measures that the Bank of England need
undertake to ensure the sound functioning of the British banking system in times of crisis. As
outlined in Humphrey (1989), this classical paradigm of the LoLR as envisioned by Thornton
and Bagehot, stressed “protecting the aggregate money stock, not individual institutions; let-
ting insolvent institutions fail; accommodating sound institutions only; charging penalty rates;
requiring good collateral; and preannouncing these conditions well in advance of any crisis so
that the markets know exactly what to expect.”1
Bordo (1990) lists four major schools of thought regarding the role of the LoLR: The first is
the classical paradigm of Thornton (1802) and Bagehot (1873) wherein the LoLR has a clearly
articulated policy of lending to any bank that is illiquid but solvent, at a penalty rate,2 and
against sound collateral (valued at pre-crisis prices).3 The second is the doctrine prompted by
Goodfriend and King (1988) who argue that the LoLR need only intervene to provide aggregate
liquidity to the banking sector by way of open market operations. They assert that LoLR
assistance to individual institutions is similar to the private provision of line-of-credit services
in that it requires costly monitoring. They, therefore, deem it redundant given the development
of the interbank market and assert that it encourages excessive risk taking. The third school
of thought, based on the work of Goodhart (1987, 1988, 1999), argues that the LoLR cannot
disentangle temporary liquidity shocks from permanent solvency shocks, and therefore advocates
basing assistance on several factors, including the wider implications of the choice between
assistance and refusal, as well as the assessed conditions of the banks in difficulties.4 Finally,
the fourth school of thought proposes free banking with no regulatory intrusion.5 Bordo (1990)
surveys the literature on free banking and concludes, based on historical evidence, that there
is normally a need for a monetary authority to act as the lender of last resort. This would be
especially true in the face of a major aggregate shock that produces a widespread demand for
1The vast body of literature on the topic that has since accumulated has been extensively surveyed by Freixas
et al. (2000).
2As noted in Goodhart (1999), Bagehot did not explicitly use the term ‘penalty’ rate. Goodhart asserts that
by use of the phrase ‘high rate of interest’, Bagehot meant a rate above the market rate prior to the crisis, but
not necessarily higher than that prevailing at the time of LoLR action.
3Rochet and Vives (2004) present a modern reformulation of the classical Bagehotian doctrine in a model
with a developed interbank market. Unlike standard models of coordination failure, their model does not rely
on the multiplicity of equilibria but has a unique Bayesian equilibrium in which an illiquid but solvent bank is,
with positive probability, unable to find liquidity assistance in the interbank market. This prompts the need for
LoLR intervention coupled with other policy measures.
4This view is contended by Bordo (1990) who claims that assistance to insolvent banks was the exception
rather than the rule until the 1970s, and that “liberal assistance to insolvent banks, combined with deposit
insurance which is not priced according to risk, encourages excessive risk-taking, creating the conditions for even
greater assistance to insolvent banks in the future.”
5Goodhart (1988, 1995) states that Bagehot (1873) supported the theoretical idea of a free banking regime
with no government intrusion, but felt that it would be too unrealistic to implement and thus sought to reform
the Bank of England as the next best option.
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high-powered money, a problem that a laissez faire, unregulated system of commercial banks
cannot adequately tackle.
While there is still much debate about the goals and objectives of a lender of last resort,
it seems to have been satisfactorily established that they should exist, and this issue has come
to the fore again in light of the recent financial crisis.6 There has been dissent, particularly
because of the issue of moral hazard, dating all the way back to the nascent days of central
banking, as evinced in the writings of François-Nicolas Mollien (1845) and Herbert Spencer
(1878). However, as Goodhart (1987) and Kindleberger and Aliber (2011) have noted, with
the evolution of the banking system and the looming spectre of contagion, there is a fairly
convincing case for intervention. Bordo (1986, 1990) provides extensive historical evidence
and asserts that a public body, acting as LoLR serves to abate financial crises. Goodhart and
Schoenmaker (1995) study a sample of 104 bank crises across 24 countries between the 1980s and
early 1990s. Of these, 73 ended up in bailouts, and in 20 of the remaining 31 cases (which ended
in liquidation), deposit insurance payments were made. Rosas (2006) studies 46 cases of bank
bailouts and develops a model of government policy response based on several key institutional
parameters. He finds that good Bagehotian LoLR responses tend to occur in relatively closed
economies, under a democratic regime, that suffer a macroeconomic shock. He also stresses the
importance of sound institutions to complement such policy responses.
The aim of this study is to address the hitherto unattempted task of modelling the lender of
last resort function in a general equilibrium framework. A general equilibrium approach with its
tenets of “agent optimization, market clearing (i.e., perfect competition with flexible prices), and
rational expectations” (Geanakoplos and Tsomocos, 2002) is desirable to study the interaction
between the real and banking sectors. Additionally, the modelling approach chosen here allows
for heterogeneous agents, endogenous default, liquidity, and money – all critical elements in
studying a model of financial crises in the tradition of Fisher (1933), Minsky (1977), Allen and
Gale (1999, 2000), and Kindleberger and Aliber (2011).
To this end, we design a two-period monetary general equilibrium model with heterogeneous
households and a risk averse banking sector, represented by a single bank,7 and incorporate the
frictions of default and money. The model is based on the work of Goodhart et al. (2010), which
itself builds upon earlier works by Goodhart et al. (2004, 2005, 2006a,b), and Tsomocos (2003).
At the outset, we model a strategic game between the commercial bank and the LoLR
wherein each is unaware of the other’s strategy but their payoff functions are common knowledge.
The bank chooses between an (exogenous) investment profile that has high tail risk, and one
that has low tail risk, and this choice affects its endowments in different states in the future.
6See Barrell and Davis (2008); Bordo (2008).
7We concede that our current one-bank model underestimates the contagion effect of default, and therefore
underestimates the importance of LoLR action in stemming contagion in a system with heterogeneous banks.
Additionally, since our model has only two periods, the charter value of the bank in the second period goes
to zero. This overstates the moral hazard implications of LoLR assistance, as in an infinite horizon model the
charter value of the bank would be greater than zero.
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If it chooses a profile with high tail risk, it ends up with relatively higher endowment in good
states of nature but ends being illiquid in bad states of nature. A low tail risk profile on the
other hand, ensures that the bank remains liquid in all future states of nature. The central
bank acting as the LoLR, unaware of the exact nature of the bank’s balance sheet, may choose
ex ante to adopt a doveish stance and bail the distressed bank out or be hawkish and liquidate
the bank.8 The strategic choices of the commercial bank and the LoLR determine the set of
decision variables and the budget sets of all agents, and the economy subsequently attains the
corresponding general equilibrium.
The economy modelled is one of exchange without production. Households maximize ex-
pected utility from the consumption of a single good, across both time periods and across all
states of nature. The commercial bank issues short term loans to provide liquidity in the mar-
ket, since households are subject to cash-in-advance constraints. It also issues inter-period loans
for agents to borrow against expected future earnings. The bank itself borrows from depositors,
and from the central bank in the form of repo loans, pledging its future monetary endowment as
collateral. This endowment may be thought of as other (exogenous) assets of the bank. Based
on the bank’s ex ante choice of risk profile, and the state of nature realised, it may end up in
a state where its monetary endowment has lower value than its loan obligations, forcing it to
default on its repo loan – and depending on the LoLR’s stance, it may or may not be bailed out.
This has implications for the default decisions of households, and affects the aggregate level of
default in the economy. Default between the agents and the commercial bank is modelled as
continuous default à la Shubik and Wilson (1977), that is, agents can partially (or fully) default
on their debt obligations to the bank if they choose to do so.
It is also worth noting how the LoLR’s objective function is set up in our model. Current
literature highlights the preservation of financial stability as one of the key roles of modern
central banks (Ortiz, 2009; Goodhart, 2011). We aimed to formalise an objective function
for the lender of last resort in keeping with this role. Following Goodhart et al. (2004) and
Tsomocos (2003), we therefore set up an objective function for the LoLR that is increasing in
banking sector profitability and decreasing in the aggregate level of default in the economy.
We calibrate the model described above to study the equilibrium strategies employed by the
two players, namely, the bank and the LoLR. In our calibrated model, we find that the unique
Nash equilibrium of the game is one of mixed strategies with the LoLR committing ex ante
to a strategy of bailing out the bank in some cases, and not in other cases.9 We consider this
mixed-strategy Nash equilibrium to be a rationalisation of the policy of constructive ambiguity.
In practice, constructive ambiguity has often been used to reduce moral hazard: Introducing
8Another interesting setup would be to study the game as a sequential one with the LoLR deciding on a
tough/soft policy stance and the commercial bank responding with a safe/risky investment profile. One would
expect to find the time inconsistency problem with the LoLR not being credibly able to commit to a tough policy
stance ex ante, analogous to that studied by Kydland and Prescott (1977).
9Our aim here is to study what the optimal ex ante stance of the LoLR should be towards bailing out distressed
banks in this framework. The issue of dynamic inconsistency of LoLR policy is beyond the scope of this study.
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uncertainty about the availability of LoLR support can force banks to behave more prudently
since they would no longer be certain of receiving assistance.
Our calibrations also reveal behaviour akin to the ‘too big to fail’ problem: We study com-
parative statics of the relative importance of aggregate default in the LoLR’s objective function.
We find that, the higher this relative importance is, the LoLR is more likely to bail out the bank
in equilibrium. As a result, the bank is also more likely to choose an investment profile with
high tail risk. In other words, the greater the perceived spillover effects of the bank’s failure
are, the more the bank can hold the LoLR to ransom and pile on risk.
Obtaining a micro-founded rationalisation of constructive ambiguity and the ‘too big to fail’
problem, in a general equilibrium framework with both real and banking sectors, is a novel
contribution of this paper. Most of the related literature focuses solely on the interaction be-
tween commercial banks and the LoLR while investigating these issues. For instance, Freixas
(1999), Freixas et al. (2000) and Freixas et al. (2004) study constructive ambiguity, and more
generally, the role of the lender of last resort in such partial equilibrium settings.10 The theo-
retical justification of constructive ambiguity in these papers is based on the classic arguments
for discretion and the need for flexibility to allow a central bank to retain credibility.11 The ‘too
big to fail’ problem has also been theoretically rationalised in the related literature on LoLR,
e.g., by Goodhart and Huang (2005). They develop a partial equilibrium macro-level model of
the LoLR. Their main claim is that financial contagion caused by the failure of a bank induces
panic and uncertainty and leads to more volatile financial markets wherein predicting behaviour
becomes more difficult. This makes it harder to correctly execute remedial macro-policy. In
the static setup of Goodhart and Huang (2005), the LoLR weighs the cost of the provision of
emergency liquidity assistance to an illiquid bank that may turn out to be insolvent, against
the loss from getting macro-policy (in this case, the level of high-powered money which is con-
trolled through open market operations) wrong in the face of the failure of the bank. This setup
results in it being optimal for the central bank to provide LoLR support to banks larger than
a threshold size, since larger banks would induce more uncertainty and hence bring about a
10Freixas (1999) asserts that LoLR intervention is essentially equivalent to extending the benefits of deposit
insurance to uninsured claim holders and is therefore distortionary. However, there are externalities generated
by bank failures especially in light of the intricate network of interbank relationships, as noted in Allen and Gale
(1999), and the LoLR needs to weigh the benefits of curbing a contagious systemic panic in the present against
the cost of potential increases in risk taking in the future. Freixas et al. (2004) study optimal LoLR policy in
the face of such moral hazard and find that LoLR intervention improves efficiency if the source of moral hazard
is in the incentives for banks to screen loans. If instead, the source is in loan monitoring by banks, then the
LoLR should not intervene and the interbank markets would discipline banks that engage in excessive risk taking.
Freixas et al. (2000) note constructive ambiguity can be introduced in a variety of styles – uncertainty about
whether assistance will be offered at all, about the timing of assistance, and about the conditions that come
attached with the offer of assistance.
11Enoch et al. (1997) claim that another justification for ambiguity is that optimal policy rules are a function of
perfect and complete information – something that one almost never finds in banking. In the face of incomplete
information, and given the short turnaround time available for critical LoLR intervention, even seemingly simple
policy rules become hard to assess and implement. Affording regulators discretion in these cases helps minimize
the risk of unjustified bank failures and bank runs.
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larger expected loss due to incorrect macro-policy. This, of course, amplifies the moral hazard
problem for big banks as they are deemed ‘too big to fail’ by the central bank.12
To the best of our knowledge, this paper is the first to study the lender of last of resort
function in a general equilibrium framework. The payoff functions of both the LoLR and the
bank are based on the competitive equilibrium values of the endogenous variables in the exchange
economy. These endogenous variables include, among other things, interest rates, households’
default rates to the bank, and the bank’s re-payment rate on deposits. These variables of the
exchange economy, in turn, depend on the strategic choices made by the LoLR and the bank,
as the bank’s choice of investment risk profile affects households’ budget sets (through their
borrowing constraints). Hence, the Nash equilibrium of the simultaneous game between the
LoLR and the bank is linked to the competitive equilibrium of the exchange economy. We
admit that our general equilibrium analysis is for now rudimentary in some aspects and we
establish existence and (local) uniqueness of equilibrium only by calibration. Further research
needs to be done on the general existence and uniqueness of equilibrium in this framework.
Section 2 below elaborates the strategic game, the structure of the economy modelled, the
sequence of agent actions, and the market structure. Section 3 defines the equilibrium of the
model and discusses its properties. A parametrised version of the model is presented in section
4. Section 5 details the comparative statics studied and section 6 concludes.
2 The model
2.1 Strategic game formulation
We model a strategic game between the commercial bank and the LoLR. The commercial
bank borrows from the central bank (a proxy for the interbank market) through a repo loan
which is collateralised. The bank’s monetary endowment is used to collateralise the loan and
depending on its ex ante choice of risk profile, the bank may end up in a state where its monetary
endowment has lower value than its loan obligations forcing it to default on the repo loan.13
The central bank acting as LoLR is unaware of the risk profile chosen the bank14, and has to
determine its ex ante policy stance without knowledge of the risk profile chosen by the bank.
We therefore have the following game tree:
12Goodhart and Huang (2005) extend their analysis to a dynamic setup as well. In that setup, the probability
of a future bank failure and the likelihood of an illiquid bank being insolvent are dependent on past LoLR actions
and the optimal LoLR policy in this case is found to be non-monotonic in bank size, and time-varying.
13We calibrate our model such that if the bank chooses a low risk profile, it is solvent in all future states of
nature, whereas if it chooses a high risk profile, it defaults in bad states of nature.
14In our calibration, we choose risk profiles that have the same expected value but differing riskiness (variance).
This is in line with the asymmetry of information assumed in our game – the central bank may be able to assess
the quality of collateral with regards to expected value but not in terms of riskiness.
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Figure 1: Strategic game tree
The payoff function for the commercial bank is its expected lifetime utility as elaborated
below in Section 2.7.3. We assume a plausible payoff function for the Central Bank (as the
LoLR), in the spirit of Goodhart et al. (2004) and Tsomocos (2003). In these papers, financial
fragility is characterised by an sharp decline in banking sector profitability coupled with a
substantial increase in aggregate default. Financial fragility is detrimental since it precipitates
welfare losses in the economy. The payoff of the Central Bank (as LoLR) is therefore chosen
to be a simple, linear function of bank profitability (increasing) and the level of default in the
economy (decreasing) less the costs of a bailout. These costs, denoted by C , include monetary
costs of the bailout borne by taxpayers, and non-monetary costs such as a softening of banks’
budget constraints and a subsequent increase in moral hazard, and other political costs.
ΠCB = ξ1
∑
s∈S∗
θspi
γ
s + ξ2
∑
s∈S∗
θs (1− νs)− C (1)
Formally, we have a strategic game Γ =
〈
N, (Ai)i∈N , (Fi)i∈N
〉
with:
A set of players: N = {Bank(γ), Central Bank - LoLR (CB)}
Action sets: Aγ = {Default (D), No Default (ND)}
ACB = {Bailout (B), No Bailout (NB)}
Payoff functions: F γ(a) = Πγ |(η,(σh)h∈H)(a) ∀a ∈ Aγ ×ACB
FCB(a) = ΠCB|(η,(σh)h∈H)(a) ∀a ∈ Aγ ×ACB
Note that the action Default (D) for the bank signifies choosing an investment profile with
high tail risk (which is calibrated to ensure default in bad states of nature), it is not an ex ante
choice to default in all future states of nature. Similarly, the action No Default (ND) signifies
the bank choosing an investment profile with low tail risk, which ensures that it ends up being
solvent in all states of nature.
The payoffs of both players are themselves determined by the equilibrium values of endoge-
nous variables in the GE model and therefore by the structural parameters. The bank’s portfolio
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choices (apart from its choice of exogenous risk profile) are continuous and competitively deter-
mined in equilibrium and hence they are not strategic choices in the game. The LoLR’s payoff
function is as defined in equation 1 above, and the bank’s payoff function is as defined in Section
2.7.3 below.
Figure 2: Payoff table for the strategic game
The risk profile chosen by the bank in the game is exogenous to the GE model but is linked
to the quality of the collateral against which it borrows from the central bank and determines
whether or not it will default in the bad state. The central bank is unaware of this strategic
choice ex ante (and therefore doesn’t know ex ante whether the bank will default or not) –
this is the information asymmetry at the heart of the simultaneous game and this is why even
though the two players may not make their moves at the same time, de facto the game can be
analysed as a simultaneous game the game since each player is unaware of the actions of the
other. This asymmetry is resolved by the Nash Equilibrium of the simultaneous game.
2.2 The economy
The economy modelled is a two period, static world which includes two agent-households (α, β)
and a representative commercial bank (γ). There are two time periods, and S possible states
of nature in the second period. State s occurs with probability θs. There is a single, perishable
consumption good in this model. Households maximize the utility15 of consumption of this good
in each time period t ∈ T = {0, 1}, and across each state of nature s ∈ S. Banks maximize
their expected profits. The set of all states is denoted s ∈ S∗ = {0} ∪ S. The set of all agents
is denoted h ∈ H = {α, β, γ}.
Household α is relatively wealthier at t = 0 while household β is relatively wealthier at
t = 1. The households therefore trade in order to smoothe consumption. Both households
interact with the commercial bank γ. There is an exogenous cash endowment given to each
household free of any obligation (ms ≥ 0, for s ∈ S∗). Endowments in goods and cash are
15In our simulations, we use a constant relative risk aversion (CRRA) utility function u(c) = c1−ρ1−ρ , to be able
to consider wealth effects.
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allowed to vary across states of nature.
Figure 3: Structure of the model
2.3 Money
Money is the stipulated means of exchange and store of value in this model. It is introduced
through cash-in-advance constraints, implying that households can only purchase the consump-
tion good by paying in cash. Money is fiat and has no consumption value but its value derives
from the fact that it is essential to conduct trade in the goods market. The Central Bank
controls the supply of money and injects it into the economy in both time periods. In the first
period the commercial bank γ borrows from depositors and extends long term loans. It also
uses its future monetary endowment as collateral to take on a repo loan from the Central Bank
and provides short-term liquidity at t = 0 to allow households to make purchases with cash. In
the second period, the bank pays back depositors, the repo loan and issues short-term liquidity
that is repaid at the end of the period when all the money exits the economy, since it has no
consumption value.
2.4 Default
All loan contracts are defaultable in this model. Default, in our model, is endogenous and
therefore a decision variable for agents. Short-term (intraperiod) loans, deposits and long-term
(interperiod) loans are unsecured in our model. Default in these markets is therefore modelled
as a continuous phenomenon as was first studied by Shubik and Wilson (1977) and was extended
to a general equilibrium framework by Dubey et al. (2005). In this case, the repayment rate
i.e. the fraction of the loan paid back is a decision variable of the debtor. Upon default, agents
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face a non-pecuniary penalty which reduces utility by a constant rate ‘λ’ per monetary unit of
account not repaid. The default penalties for the short-term loan, long-term loan, and deposit
markets are denoted λs, λ¯s, and λds , respectively. Each additional monetary unit of account
defaulted increases income of the debtor and this has a marginal effect on the agent’s utility.
However not delivering this additional unit of account also entails a utility loss equal to the
default penalty λ. In equilibrium agents therefore decide to default completely, not at all, or
partially depending on the marginal gain and marginal loss in utility from defaulting.
Since we assume that expectations are rational in equilibrium, the expected rates of delivery
on short-term loans, long-term loans and deposits are equal to the actual rates of delivery. This
allows us to establish default as an equilibrium phenomenon that can coexist with the orderly
functioning of the financial system.
In addition, repo loans offered by the central bank to the commercial bank are secured by
collateral. The commercial bank γ would therefore chooses to default on its repo loan obligation
at t = 1 when the value of the collateral i.e. the monetary endowment in state s ∈ S is less than
the repo loan amount. In case the commercial bank defaults and the central bank decides to bail
it out, it lets the bank continue despite of the default on the repo loan and offers the commercial
bank additional funds at a discount window at a discount rate τ . If instead the central bank’s
stance is to not bail the commercial bank out, in the bad state of nature, when the commercial
bank is unable to repay the repo loan in full, the central bank seizes the collateral, liquidates
the bank and pays out depositors in order of seniority.
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Figure 4: Timeline of the model
B: Bank, LoLR: Lender of Last Resort, CB: Central Bank, H: Households
2.5 Timing
There are five markets that convene at each time period t ∈ T . The short-term (intraperiod)
loan, long-term (interperiod) loan, deposit, and repo loan markets meet at the beginning of
each time period, and the goods market meets subsequently in each period. As in Goodhart et
al. (2010), this setup is chosen because it “maximizes the number of transactions possible and
allows households to borrow in the short-term money market in order to invest in long-term
bond or asset markets. It also allows for an explicit speculative motive for holding money.” A
timeline of the model is provided in Figure 4.
2.6 Decision variables and budget sets
We denote macro variables, which are determined in equilibrium and which each household
takes as fixed, by η = (p, r, rd, ρ, r¯) ∈ RS∗+ × RS
∗
+ × R+ × R+ × R+.
The vectors of household α and β’s decisions are denoted, σα ∈ Σα(η) and σβ ∈ Σβ(η), re-
spectively. σα = (bα, qα, µα, dα, να) ∈ RS+×R+×R+×R+×R+ and σβ = (bβ, qβ,µβ, µ¯β, ν¯β,νβ) ∈
R+ × RS+ × RS+ × R+ × RS+ × RS+.
The vector of the commercial bank γ’s decisions is denoted σγ ∈ Σγ(η) where σγ =
(piγ ,mγ , m¯γ , µγd , µ
γ
R,ν
γ) ∈ RS∗+ × RS
∗
+ × R+ × R+ × R+ × RS+.
The variables used in the model are:
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ps : Price of the good in state s ∈ S∗
rs : Short-term loan rate offered by the bank in state s ∈ S∗
rd : Interest rate on deposits offered by the bank
ρ : Interest rate on repo loans offered by the central bank
r¯ : Long-term loan rate offered by the bank
bhs : Amount of money spent on goods by household h ∈ {α, β} in state s ∈ S∗
qhs : Quantity of goods offered for sale by household h ∈ {α, β} in state s ∈ S∗
µhs : Short-term borrowing by household h ∈ {α, β} in state s ∈ S∗
νhs : Short-term loan repayment rate of household h ∈ {α, β} in state s ∈ S∗
dα : Deposit by household α at t = 0
µ¯β : Long-term borrowing by household β at t = 0
ν¯βs : Long-term repayment rate of household β in state s ∈ S
ch : Coefficient of risk aversion of agent h ∈ H
θs : Probability of state s ∈ S
chs : Consumption of household h ∈ {α, β} in state s ∈ S∗
ehs : Goods endowment of household h ∈ {α, β} in state s ∈ S∗
mhs : Monetary endowment of household h ∈ {α, β} in state s ∈ S∗
eγs,i : Monetary endowment of bank γ in state s ∈ S∗, under risk profile i ∈ {H,L}
MCB : Money supply at t = 0
MCBs : Money injection by the central bank in the short-term loan market in state
s ∈ S
τ : Borrowing rate at the discount window in case of a bailout
λs : Non-pecuniary penalty for defaulting on short-term loans in state s ∈ S∗
λ¯s : Non-pecuniary penalty for defaulting on long-term loans in state s ∈ S
λDs : Non-pecuniary penalty for defaulting on deposits in state s ∈ S
piγ0 : Bank profits at t = 0
mγs : Short-term loan extension by the bank in state s ∈ S∗
m¯γ : Long-term loan extension by the bank at t = 0
µγR : Amount borrowed by the bank via repo loans at t = 0
µγd : Amount borrowed by the bank via deposits at t = 0
νγs : Bank’s repayment rate on deposits in state s ∈ S∗
cγ0 : Bank’s retained earnings at t = 0
2.7 Agents’ behaviour
2.7.1 Household α
Household α maximizes its utility from the consumption of the good in each period, and across
each state of nature. Endowed with relatively more of the good at t = 0 than at t = 1, and
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with cash, it smoothes consumption by selling part of its endowment at t = 0 and depositing
part of its wealth with the commercial bank γ. In the second period, it uses its wealth to buy
some of the consumption good.
Agent α’s optimization problem is as follows
max
σα∈Σα
Πα = {u(cα0 )− λ0max[0, (1− να0 )µα0 ]}+
∑
s∈S
θsu(cαs )
s.t. Bα(η) = {σα ∈ Σα(η) : (01α)− (s1α)}
Agent α faces the following constraints:
(01α) dα ≤ µ
α
0
1 + r0
+mα0
(02α) µα0 να0 ≤ p0qα0
(s1α) bαs ≤ dα(1 + rd)νγs +mαs
(01α) says that in the beginning of t = 0, household α borrows short-term and deposits these
funds along with its monetary endowment for use in t = 1.
(02α) says that at the end of t = 0, household α repays the short-term loan using the proceeds
of good sales.
(s1α) says that at the beginning of each state s ∈ S, household α uses the returns on its deposits
and its monetary endowment to purchase the good.
Note that household α cannot sell more than its endowment and therefore qα0 ≤ eα0 . θs is the
probability of state s occurring, cα0 = (eα0 − qα0 ) is household α’s consumption in state 0 and
cαs = (eαs +
bαs
ps
) is household α’s consumption in state s ∈ S.
2.7.2 Household β
Household β is endowed with relatively more of the good at t = 1 than at t = 0, and with cash.
In order to smoothe consumption, it takes on an interperiod loan from the bank γ to buy some
of the consumption good at t = 0. In the second period, it sells some of its endowment to pay
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back part of its loan.
Household β’s optimization problem is as follows
max
σβ∈Σβ
Πβ = u(cβ0 ) +
∑
s∈S
θs{u(cβs )− λ¯smax[0, (1− ν¯βs )µ¯β]− λsmax[0, (1− νβs )µβs ]}
s.t. Bβ(η) = {σβ ∈ Σβ(η) : (01β)− (s2β)}
Household β faces the following constraints:
(01β) bβ0 ≤
µ¯β
1 + r¯ +m
β
0
(s1β) µ¯β ν¯βs ≤
µβs
1 + rs
+mβs
(s2β) µβs νβs ≤ psqβs
(01β) says that in t = 0, household β takes out a long-term loan and uses this along with its
monetary endowment to purchase the consumption good.
(s1β) says that at the beginning of each state s ∈ S, household β repays some fraction of the
long-term loan using short-term borrowings and irs monetary endowment.
(s2β) says that at the end of each state s ∈ S, household β repays the short-term loan using
the proceeds of good sales.
Note that household β cannot sell more than its endowment and therefore qβs ≤ eβs .cβ0 = (eβ0 + b
β
0
p0
)
is household β’s consumption in state 0 and cβs = (eβs − qβs ) is household β’s consumption in
state s ∈ S. Its utility in state s ∈ S is subject to a default penalties which are linear in the
amount defaulted.
2.7.3 Commercial bank γ
The commercial bank γ is risk averse and maximizes expected utility of profits in both periods.
It has quadratic preferences over profits i.e. it faces a portfolio allocation problem wherein it
tries to diversify idiosyncratic risk. It borrows from depositors and from the central bank via a
repo loan collateralized by its future monetary endowment. It uses these funds to extend short
term liquidity in both periods and extend long-term credit via an interperiod loan. It faces a
shock in monetary endowment that may make it illiquid in the bad state of nature, forcing it to
default on its repo loan obligation. Depending on the realization of this shock and the policy
stance of the LoLR, which is unknown to it, the commercial bank γ solves one of the following
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three optimization problems.
The commercial bank γ’s optimization problem is as follows
(a) No Default Case
max
σγ∈Σγ
Πγ = {piγ0 − cγ(piγ0 )2}+
∑
s∈S
θs{piγs − cγ(piγs )2 − λDs max[0, (1− νγs )µγd ]}
s.t. Bγ(ND)(η) = {σγ ∈ Σγ(η) : (01γ)− (s2γ)}
In this case, the commercial bank γ faces the following constraints:
(01γ) mγ0 + m¯γ ≤
µγd
1 + rd
+ µ
γ
R
1 + ρ + e
γ
0
(02γ) piγ0 ≤ mγ0(1 + r0)να0
Let Sγ ⊆ S denote all the states where the bank is solvent on its repo loan, i.e.
eγs > µ
γ
R ∀s ∈ Sγ
In the No Default case, Sγ = S and therefore the bank’s second period
budget constraints are:
(s1γ) mγs + µ
γ
dν
γ
s + µ
γ
R ≤ ∆(02γ) + m¯γ(1 + r¯)ν¯βs + eγs
(s2γ) piγs ≤ mγs (1 + rs)νβs
(01γ) says that in t = 0, the commercial bank γ borrows from depositors and from the Central
Bank, via a repo loan, and this combined with its monetary endowment is used to fund short-
term and long-term loan offerings. The bank’s monetary endowment (which may be thought of
as its other assets) is used as collateral for the repo loan taken from the Central Bank.
(02γ) says that at the end of t = 0, the commercial bank γ keeps short-term loan repayment as
profit.
(s1γ) says that at the beginning of each state s ∈ S, where the value of bank’s monetary endow-
ment is greater than that of the repo loan repayment, bank γ uses long term loan repayment,
its monetary endowment in state s, and the cash carried over from the first period (∆(02γ)) to
pay back depositors and the Central Bank, and issue short-term loans in state s.
(s2γ) says that at the end of each state s ∈ S, bank γ keeps the short-term loan repayment as
profit.
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(b) Bailout Case
max
σγ∈Σγ
Πγ = {piγ0 − cγ(piγ0 )2}+
∑
s∈S
θs{piγs − cγ(piγs )2 − λDs max[0, (1− νγs )µγd ]}
s.t. Bγ(DB)(η) = {σγ ∈ Σγ(η) : (01γ)− (s2γ)(DB)}
In this case, the commercial bank γ faces the following constraints:
(01γ) mγ0 + m¯γ ≤
µγd
1 + rd
+ µ
γ
R
1 + ρ + e
γ
0
(02γ) piγ0 ≤ mγ0(1 + r0)να0
For all states s ∈ Sγ the bank’s second period budget constraints are:
(s1γ) mγs + µ
γ
dν
γ
s + µ
γ
R ≤ ∆(02γ) + m¯γ(1 + r¯)ν¯βs + eγs
(s2γ) piγs ≤ mγs (1 + rs)νβs
For all states s /∈ Sγ the bank’s second period budget constraints are:
(s1γ)(DB) mγs + µ
γ
dν
γ
s ≤ ∆(02γ) + m¯γ(1 + r¯)ν¯βs +
µγB
1 + τ
(s2γ)(DB) piγs ≤ mγs (1 + rs)νβs − µγB
(01γ) says that in t = 0, the commercial bank γ borrows from depositors and from the Central
Bank, via a repo loan, and this combined with its monetary endowment is used to fund short-
term and long-term loan offerings. The bank’s monetary endowment (which may be thought of
as its other assets) is used as collateral for the repo loan taken from the Central Bank.
(02γ) says that at the end of t = 0, the commercial bank γ keeps short-term loan repayment as
profit.
(s1γ) says that at the beginning of each state s ∈ Sγ , where the value of bank’s monetary
endowment is greater than that of the repo loan repayment, bank γ uses long term loan re-
payment, its monetary endowment in state s, and the cash carried over from the first period
(∆(02γ)) to pay back depositors and the Central Bank, and issue short-term loans in state s.
(s2γ) says that at the end of each state s ∈ Sγ , bank γ keeps the short-term loan repayment as
profit.
(s1γ)(DB) says that at the beginning of each state s /∈ Sγ , where the value of bank’s monetary
endowment is lower than that of the repo loan repayment, bank γ defaults on its repo loan but
is bailed out and allowed to borrow from the discount window at an interest rate τ and uses
this default window borrowing along with long term loan repayment, and the cash carried over
from the first period to pay back depositors and to issue short-term loans in state s.
(s2γ)(DB) says that at the end of each state s /∈ Sγ , bank γ uses the short-term loan repayment
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to repay the discount window borrowing (in full) and keeps the rest as profit.
(c) No Bailout Case
max
σγ∈Σγ
Πγ = {piγ0 − cγ(piγ0 )2}+
∑
s∈Sγ
θs{piγs − cγ(piγs )2 − λDs max[0, (1− νγs )µγd ]}
s.t. Bγ(DN)(η) = {σγ ∈ Σγ(η) : (01γ)− (s2γ)}
The commercial bank γ faces the following constraints:
(01γ) mγ0 + m¯γ ≤
µγd
1 + rd
+ µ
γ
R
1 + ρ + e
γ
0
(02γ) piγ0 ≤ mγ0(1 + r0)να0
For all states s ∈ Sγ the bank’s second period budget constraints are:
(s1γ) mγs + µ
γ
dν
γ
s + µ
γ
R ≤ ∆(02γ) + m¯γ(1 + r¯)ν¯βs + eγs
(s2γ) piγs ≤ mγs (1 + rs)νβs
(01γ) says that in t = 0, the commercial bank γ borrows from depositors and from the Central
Bank, via a repo loan, and this combined with its monetary endowment is used to fund short-
term and long-term loan offerings. The bank’s monetary endowment (which may be thought of
as its other assets) is used as collateral for the repo loan taken from the Central Bank.
(02γ) says that at the end of t = 0, the commercial bank γ keeps short-term loan repayment as
profit.
(s1γ) says that at the beginning of each state s ∈ Sγ , where the value of bank’s monetary
endowment is greater than that of the repo loan repayment, bank γ uses long term loan re-
payment, its monetary endowment in state s, and the cash carried over from the first period
(∆(02γ)) to pay back depositors and the Central Bank, and issue short-term loans in state s.
(s2γ) says that at the end of each state s ∈ Sγ , bank γ keeps the short-term loan repayment
as profit. Since the bank rationally expects not to be bailed out if it defaults, its maximization
problem is restricted to the states s ∈ Sγ . In this case, when the bank defaults on its repo loan
(i.e. in s /∈ Sγ), the Central Bank seizes the collateral and hands over all remaining bank assets
to depositors who are the senior creditors. We assume costless liquidation of the bank’s assets.
The depositors have to therefore take a haircut on their deposits. The effective repayment rate
on deposits for the states s /∈ Sγ is therefore defined as, νγs = ∆(02
γ)+m¯γ(1+r¯)ν¯βs
µγ
d
∀s /∈ Sγ .
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2.8 Market clearing conditions
Each of the five markets in the model clears at a price that balances supply and demand in
equilibrium. The market clearing conditions are:
(MC1) p0 =
bβ0
qα0
(MC2) ps =
bαs
qαs
, ∀s ∈ S
(MC3) (1 + r0) =
µα0
mγ0
(MC4) (1 + rs) =
µβs
(mγs +MCBs )
, ∀s ∈ S
(MC5) (1 + r¯) =
µ¯β
m¯γ
(MC6) (1 + rd) =
µγd
dα
(MC7) (1 + ρ) =
µγR
MCB
(MC1) and (MC2) say that in each state s ∈ S∗ the goods market clears when the amount of
money offered for the good is exchanged for the quantity of the good offered for sale.
(MC3) says that at t = 0 the short-term loan market clears when the amount of short-term
credit demanded by households is exchanged for the amount of short-term credit offered by the
bank.
(MC4) says that in each state s ∈ S the short-term loan market clears when the amount of
short-term credit demanded by households is exchanged for the amount of short-term credit
offered by the bank and the amount injected by the central bank.
(MC5) says that the long-term loan market clears when the amount of long-term credit de-
manded by households is exchanged for the amount of long-term credit offered by the bank.
(MC6) says that the deposit market clears when the amount of deposit borrowing demanded
by the bank is exchanged for the amount of deposits offered by households.
(MC7) says that the repo loan market clears when the amount of interbank borrowing demanded
by the bank is exchanged for the amount of money supplied by the central bank.
3 Equilibrium
There are two equilibrium concepts contained within this model – equilibrium in the strategic
game, and a rational expectations equilibrium corresponding to each of the possible combina-
tions of player actions. Their definitions and properties are explained below.
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3.1 Definitions
3.1.1 Nash equilibrium
The mixed extension of the (finite) strategic game Γ =
〈
N, (Ai)i∈N , (Fi)i∈N
〉
is the strategic
game Γˆ =
〈
N,
(
∆ (Ai)i∈N
)
,
(
Fˆi
)
i∈N
〉
wherein ∆ (Ai) is the set of probability distributions over
Ai, and for each α ∈ ×j∈N∆ (Aj), Fˆi (α) = ∑a∈A (∏j∈N αj (aj))Fi (a).
The mixed strategy Nash equilibrium of the strategic game Γ =
〈
N, (Ai)i∈N , (Fi)i∈N
〉
is the
Nash equilibrium of its mixed extension Γˆ =
〈
N,
(
∆ (Ai)i∈N
)
,
(
Fˆi
)
i∈N
〉
. For the game defined
in this paper, it is therefore a distribution over a profile of actions α∗ ∈ ∆ (Aγ)×∆ (ACB) with
the property that for every player-type i ∈ N , every pure strategy in the support of α∗i is a best
response to α∗−i.
3.1.2 Monetary equilibrium with commercial banks, default, and the lender of
last resort
Based on the strategic choices of the Bank and the LoLR, one of three possible equilibria
attains. We say that (η, (σh)h∈H)(xx), (xx) ∈ {ND,DB,DN} is a monetary equilibrium with
commercial banks, default, and the lender of last resort (MEBDL) iff:
(1) σα ∈ arg max
σα∈Bα(η)
Πα
(2) σβ ∈ arg max
σβ∈Bβ(η)
Πβ
(3) σγ ∈ arg max
σγ∈Bγ(xx)(η)
Πγ , (xx) ∈ {ND,DB,DN}
(4) Equations (MC1) – (MC7) hold
Conditions (1), (2) and (3) ensure optimizing behaviour by both households and the com-
mercial bank, and condition (4) implies that all markets clear. An equilibrium is therefore
characterized by market clearing, rational expectations (i.e. correct anticipation of current and
future prices, interest rates and repayment rates) and by agents optimizing within their budget
sets.
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3.2 Properties
3.2.1 Properties of the Nash equilibrium
The simultaneous game between the Bank and Central Bank has no pure strategy Nash equi-
librium, so long as we have:
ΠγDB > Π
γ
ND > Π
γ
DN
ΠCBDN > ΠCBDB
and, ΠCBNB > ΠCBNN
Allowing for mixed strategies, the bank is indifferent between Defaulting or Not Defaulting if
the Central Bank plays a mixed strategy wherein it chooses to Bailout with probability
α∗CB(B) =
(ΠγND −ΠγDN )
(ΠγDB −ΠγDN )
Similarly, the Central Bank would be indifferent between Bailing out or not if the bank plays a
mixed strategy wherein it chooses to default with probability
α∗γ(D) =
(ΠCBNB −ΠCBNN )
(ΠCBDN −ΠCBDB) + (ΠCBNB −ΠCBNN )
We therefore have the mixed strategy Nash equilibrium α∗ ∈ ∆ (Aγ) × ∆ (ACB) in the game
Γ =
〈
N, (Ai)i∈N , (Fi)i∈N
〉
with:
Action sets:
Aγ = {Default (D), No Default (ND)}
ACB = {Bailout (B), No Bailout (NB)}
Probability distributions:
α∗ (Aγ) =
{
(ΠCBNB −ΠCBNN )
(ΠCBDN −ΠCBDB) + (ΠCBNB −ΠCBNN )
,
(ΠCBDN −ΠCBDB)
(ΠCBDN −ΠCBDB) + (ΠCBNB −ΠCBNN )
}
α∗ (ACB) =
{
(ΠγND −ΠγDN )
(ΠγDB −ΠγDN )
,
(ΠγDB −ΠγND)
(ΠγDB −ΠγDN )
}
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3.2.2 Properties of the MEBDL
The following properties of the monetary equilibrium with commercial banks, default, and the
lender of last resort hold. The existence of a local, stable equilibrium is proved numerically (see
appendix). The formal proofs of the properties follow directly from Tsomocos (2003).
Relative Structure of Interest Rates The relative structure of interest rates is affected by
the credit extension of banks and by default by agents. Overall liquidity in the model affects
interest rates because it is a finite horizon model and fiat money must exit the system in the final
period. Both inside and outside money therefore exit the system in the final period through
loan repayments from households to banks and banks to the central bank. Default emerges
as an equilibrium phenomenon affecting interest rates because the interest rates that clear the
different debt markets price in the corresponding expected repayment rates through rational
expectations.
Monetary Policy Non-Neutrality Given the presence of outside money in the model and
default in debt markets, we have positive nominal interest rates ensuing since fiat money has a
positive value and price. This value is derived from the role of money in facilitating all trans-
actions, enforced through the cash-in-advance constraint. This also highlights the importance
of liquidity.
The Quantity Theory of Money This model has a non-trivial quantity theory of money.
Nominal changes affect both prices and quantities and therefore have a real effect. In each state
s ∈ S, nominal income equals the total money stock since all the liquidity available is pushed
through to the goods market.
The Fisher Effect Nominal inter-period interest rates are approximately equal to real inter-
est rates plus expected inflation and a risk premium.
4 Calibration
Henceforth, we limit our discussion to a calibration of the model. First, for each possible combi-
nation of strategic choices of the commercial bank and the LoLR, we compute the (competitive)
monetary equilibrium attained across households and the commercial bank in our calibrated
model. Subsequently, given the payoffs based on the computed monetary equilibria, we solve
for the Nash equilibrium of the strategic game between the commercial bank and the LoLR.
The exogenous variables used for the calibration of the economy are summarised below in
Table 1. The parameters are chosen to clearly illustrate the effects of the ex ante strategic
actions of the two players – the commercial bank, and the LoLR, on the payoffs and decisions
of all agents. We allow for three states of nature at t = 1, a two ‘good’ states with probability
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0.8 and 0.15 respectively, and a ‘bad’ state with probability 0.05. Agent α is modelled as being
relatively wealthier in the first period and therefore a net lender, whereas agent β is relatively
wealthier in the second period and is therefore a net borrower. The exogenous risk profiles of
the bank eγs,i, s ∈ S, i ∈ {H,L} are chosen such that they have the same expected value but
differ significantly in riskiness. The high risk profile carries substantial tail risk, with a large
reduction in value in the bad state of nature, while the low risk profile is risk free. Default
penalties are chosen to allow for partial repayment (i.e. an intermediate level of default) in all
states, to clearly observe changes across the different monetary equilibria.
Tables 2, 3, and 4 summarise the values of decision variables and prices that attain at the
No Default, Default & Bailout, and Default & No Bailout monetary equilibrium, respectively.
To allow for an appropriate comparison of the different equilibria, the exogenous variables used
in all three monetary equilibria are the same except for exogenous risk profiles of the bank
eγs,i, s ∈ S, i ∈ {H,L} which differ based on the strategic choice of the bank. The No Default
monetary equilibrium is realised when the bank chooses the low risk (riskless) profile, and results
in the bank being solvent in all states of nature. The monetary endowments of the bank in this
equilibrium are set to be eγs,L, s ∈ S. From the point of view of the bank (and the other agents),
the No Default & No Bailout monetary equilibrium is identical to the No Default & Bailout
monetary equilibrium, hence we have only one calibration. In the Default monetary equilibria,
the only exogenous parameters that are different to the No Default monetary equilibrium are
the monetary endowments of the bank which are now set to the high risk profile i.e. eγs,H , s ∈ S.
Apart from the change in exogenous parameters, as described in Section 2.7 the budget sets
and choice sets of the agents are different based on the stance of the LoLR assumed.
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Table 1: Exogenous variables
Risk Aversion Probabilities Endowments Central Bank Default LoLRGoods Money Banks Parameters Penalties Payoff
cα 1.2 θ1 0.80 eα0 3 mα0 0.5 e
γ
0,L 27 MCB 25 λ0 0.96% ξ1 5
cβ 1.2 θ2 0.15 eα1 1 mα1 0.5 e
γ
1,L 27 MCB1 5 λ1 0.93% ξ2 -10
cγ 0.006 θ3 0.05 eα2 1 mα2 0.5 e
γ
2,L 27 MCB2 5 λ2 0.79% C 1
eα3 1 mα3 0.5 e
γ
3,L 27 MCB3 5 λ3 0.74%
eβ0 1 m
β
0 3 e
γ
0,H 27 τ 4% λ¯1 1.00%
eβ1 3 m
β
1 2.5 e
γ
1,H 27.5 λ¯2 1.00%
eβ2 3 m
β
2 2.2 e
γ
2,H 27 λ¯3 1.00%
eβ3 3 m
β
3 0.5 e
γ
3,H 19 λD1 65.00%
λD2 77.00%
λD3 75.00%
ch : Coefficient of risk aversion of household h ∈ H
θs : Probability of state s ∈ S
ehs : Goods endowment of household h ∈ {α, β} in state s ∈ S∗
mhs : Monetary endowment of household h ∈ {α, β} in state s ∈ S∗
eγs,i : Monetary endowment of bank γ in state s ∈ S∗, under risk profile i ∈ {H,L}
MCB : Money supply at t = 0
MCBs : Money injection by the central bank in the short-term loan market in state s ∈ S
τ : Borrowing rate at the discount window in case of a bailout
λs : Non-pecuniary penalty for defaulting on short-term loans in state s ∈ S∗
λ¯s : Non-pecuniary penalty for defaulting on long-term loans in state s ∈ S
λDs : Non-pecuniary penalty for defaulting on deposits in state s ∈ S
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Table 2: Monetary equilibrium values, No Default (ND)
Prices Interest Rates Household α Household β Bank γ
Decisions Decisions Decisions
p0 43.02 r0 6.54% qα0 0.91 b
β
0 39.18 pi
γ
0 27.25
p1 43.70 r1 8.10% bα1 38.13 q
β
1 0.87 m
γ
0 54.99
p2 48.42 r2 26.00% bα2 37.83 q
β
1 0.78 m
γ
1 30.59
p3 49.59 r3 35.00% bα3 34.51 q
β
1 0.70 m
γ
2 25.49
r¯ 6.88% µα0 39.17 µ¯β 38.67 m
γ
3 25.12
rd 1.33% dα 41.19 µβ1 38.48 m¯γ 36.18
ρ 1.33% να0 95.11% µ
β
2 38.41 µ¯
γ
R 25.33
µβ3 40.67 µ¯
γ
d 39.69
ν¯β1 98.52% ν
γ
1 94.83%
ν¯β2 84.53% ν
γ
2 94.08%
ν¯β3 75.00% ν
γ
3 85.71%
νβ1 99.11% c
γ
0 28.47
νβ2 98.50%
νβ3 84.87%
ps : Price of the good in state s ∈ S∗
rs : Short-term loan rate offered by the bank in state s ∈ S∗
r¯ : Long-term loan rate offered by the bank
rd : Interest rate on deposits offered by the bank
ρ : Interest rate on repo loans offered by the central bank
qhs : Quantity of goods offered for sale by household h ∈ {α, β} in state s ∈ S∗
bhs : Amount of money spent on goods by household h ∈ {α, β} in state s ∈ S∗
µhs : Short-term borrowing by household h ∈ {α, β} in state s ∈ S∗
νhs : Short-term loan repayment rate of household h ∈ {α, β} in state s ∈ S∗
dα : Deposit by household α at t = 0
µ¯β : Long-term borrowing by household β at t = 0
ν¯βs : Long-term repayment rate of household β in state s ∈ S
piγ0 : Bank profits at t = 0
mγs : Short-term loan extension by the bank in state s ∈ S∗
m¯γ : Long-term loan extension by the bank at t = 0
µγR : Amount borrowed by the bank via repo loans at t = 0
µγd : Amount borrowed by the bank via deposits at t = 0
νγs : Bank’s repayment rate on deposits in state s ∈ S∗
cγ0 : Bank’s retained earnings at t = 0
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Table 3: Monetary equilibrium values, Default & Bailout (DB)
Prices Interest Rates Household α Household β Bank γ
Decisions Decisions Decisions
p0 42.98 r0 6.16% qα0 0.91 b
β
0 39.06 pi
γ
0 27.25
p1 43.52 r1 8.10% bα1 37.66 q
β
1 0.87 m
γ
0 55.06
p2 47.86 r2 26.00% bα2 36.36 q
β
1 0.76 m
γ
1 30.45
p3 49.95 r3 35.00% bα3 35.48 q
β
1 0.71 m
γ
2 25.05
r¯ 7.11% µα0 39.12 µ¯β 38.62 m
γ
3 29.11
rd 1.13% dα 41.00 µβ1 38.32 m¯γ 36.06
ρ 7.09% να0 95.26% µ
β
2 37.86 µ¯
γ
R 26.77
µβ3 46.05 µ¯
γ
d 39.56
ν¯β1 98.25% ν
γ
1 93.93%
ν¯β2 83.49% ν
γ
2 90.64%
ν¯β3 74.79% ν
γ
3 88.41%
νβ1 98.28% c
γ
0 28.44
νβ2 96.05% µ
γ
B 7.04
νβ3 77.04%
ps : Price of the good in state s ∈ S∗
rs : Short-term loan rate offered by the bank in state s ∈ S∗
r¯ : Long-term loan rate offered by the bank
rd : Interest rate on deposits offered by the bank
ρ : Interest rate on repo loans offered by the central bank
qhs : Quantity of goods offered for sale by household h ∈ {α, β} in state s ∈ S∗
bhs : Amount of money spent on goods by household h ∈ {α, β} in state s ∈ S∗
µhs : Short-term borrowing by household h ∈ {α, β} in state s ∈ S∗
νhs : Short-term loan repayment rate of household h ∈ {α, β} in state s ∈ S∗
dα : Deposit by household α at t = 0
µ¯β : Long-term borrowing by household β at t = 0
ν¯βs : Long-term repayment rate of household β in state s ∈ S
piγ0 : Bank profits at t = 0
mγs : Short-term loan extension by the bank in state s ∈ S∗
m¯γ : Long-term loan extension by the bank at t = 0
µγR : Amount borrowed by the bank via repo loans at t = 0
µγd : Amount borrowed by the bank via deposits at t = 0
νγs : Bank’s repayment rate on deposits in state s ∈ S∗
cγ0 : Bank’s retained earnings at t = 0
µγB : Additional funds borrowed by the bank at the discount window
when bailed out at t = 1
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Table 4: Monetary equilibrium values, Default & No Bailout (DN)
Prices Interest Rates Household α Household β Bank γ
Decisions Decisions Decisions
p0 42.92 r0 1.94% qα0 0.91 b
β
0 38.90 pi
γ
0 30.38
p1 42.72 r1 8.10% bα1 35.55 q
β
1 0.83 m
γ
0 55.16
p2 47.25 r2 26.00% bα2 34.75 q
β
1 0.74 m
γ
1 29.72
p3 184.63 r3 542.28% bα3 32.11 q
β
1 0.17 m
γ
2 24.50
r¯ 0.87% µα0 39.07 µ¯β 38.57 m¯γ 35.90
rd 0.87% dα 39.32 µβ1 37.53 µ¯
γ
R 25.22
ρ 7.42% να0 98.95% µ
β
2 37.17 µ¯
γ
d 39.41
µβ3 32.11 ν
γ
1 88.94%
ν¯β1 96.51% ν
γ
2 86.91%
ν¯β2 82.20% c
γ
0 25.27
ν¯β3 16.45%
νβ1 94.72% ν
γ
3 80.22%
νβ2 93.49%
νβ3 100%
ps : Price of the good in state s ∈ S∗
rs : Short-term loan rate offered by the bank in state s ∈ S∗
r¯ : Long-term loan rate offered by the bank
rd : Interest rate on deposits offered by the bank
ρ : Interest rate on repo loans offered by the central bank
qhs : Quantity of goods offered for sale by household h ∈ {α, β} in state s ∈ S∗
bhs : Amount of money spent on goods by household h ∈ {α, β} in state s ∈ S∗
µhs : Short-term borrowing by household h ∈ {α, β} in state s ∈ S∗
νhs : Short-term loan repayment rate of household h ∈ {α, β} in state s ∈ S∗
dα : Deposit by household α at t = 0
µ¯β : Long-term borrowing by household β at t = 0
ν¯βs : Long-term repayment rate of household β in state s ∈ S
piγ0 : Bank profits at t = 0
mγs : Short-term loan extension by the bank in state s ∈ Sγ
m¯γ : Long-term loan extension by the bank at t = 0
µγR : Amount borrowed by the bank via repo loans at t = 0
µγd : Amount borrowed by the bank via deposits at t = 0
νγs : Bank’s repayment rate on deposits in state s ∈ Sγ
cγ0 : Bank’s retained earnings at t = 0
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As can be seen from the tables above, the No Default monetary equilibrium leads to stable
prices and reasonable levels of default, with an expected drop in credit extension by the bank in
the bad state of nature, and a subsequent increase in default levels. This effect is exacerbated
in the two Default monetary equilibria since in this case the bad state is characterised by a
significant drop in the bank’s monetary endowment. In the case of the Default & Bailout
monetary equilibrium, the availability of bailout funds at the discount window allows the bank
to borrow in the bad state and extend credit despite the shock in the value of its monetary
endowment and this allows for prices to remain stable and at levels comparable to the no
default monetary equilibrium. Default levels are slightly higher in this monetary equilibrium
since the presence of the discount window in the bad state of nature is rationally expected by
all agents and this allows for a shifting in consumption which increases the marginal benefit
from defaulting in the good states, thereby increasing the default levels slightly. The Default
& No Bailout monetary equilibrium is much starker in contrast to the other two. In this case
the bank defaults in the third state and so credit extension in this state stems solely due to the
liquidity injection by the central bank in short-term debt markets. Short term interest rates in
this state therefore spike up and this precipitates default by household β in the long-term debt
market. This reduces the value of the bank’s assets, which are seized by the central bank upon
its default, and handed over to the senior creditors – depositors. The depositors therefore end
up taking a haircut on their debt. The shortage in credit supply precipitated by the failure of
the bank in the bad state also affects the goods market raising prices significantly in this state.
Figure 5: Payoffs of the two players in the strategic game
Figure 5 lists the payoffs for the two players given their strategic choices: Bailout (B)
versus No Bailout (NB) choices for the LoLR, and Default (D) versus No Default (ND) choices
for the bank. Figure 6 illustrates the mixed strategy Nash equilibrium, along with the best
response functions for each player. The parameter values of the payoff function of the LoLR
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are listed in Table 1. We place a positive weight on bank profitability, a negative weight on the
level of aggregate default, and assume a positive cost for adopting a doveish stance and being
prepared to bail banks out in bad states. We find that for our parametrisation, there exists
no pure strategy Nash equilibrium. Instead, both agents play a mixed strategy with the bank
choosing a high risk profile with probability α∗γ(D) = 0.2102, and the LoLR adopts an ex ante
doveish stance (i.e. is amenable to bailing the bank out in case of distress) with probability
α∗CB(B) = 0.3050. The existence of a mixed strategy Nash equilibrium is robust to wide range
of parameter values as discussed in the comparative statics exercises conducted in Section 5.
Figure 6: Mixed strategy Nash equilibrium in the strategic game
The best response function of the commercial bank is shown by the solid line, whereas that of the
LoLR is shown by the dashed line.
We take this mixed strategy Nash equilibrium to be a rationalisation of the policy of con-
structive ambiguity that has been pursued by most central banks with regards to their stance on
bailing out distressed banks.16 The LoLR in equilibrium commits ex ante to a mixed strategy
of bailing out sometimes, and not bailing out other times to induce optimal behaviour by the
commercial bank.
5 Comparative statics
In this section, we study the effects of changes in the exogenous parameters of the model on its
equilibrium. Although the model allows for a variety of such exercises, we present in detail two
16See Freixas (1999); Freixas et al. (2000, 2004); Goodhart and Huang (2005) for an extensive discussion of
constructive ambiguity.
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specific cases that we reckon are the most interesting and pertinent to the analysis carried out
in this paper.
5.1 Changes in the exogenous risk profile of the commercial bank
For this exercise, we study the effects of varying the riskiness (variance) of the high risk profile
available to the bank as an ex ante strategic choice along with the low risk profile, which is
calibrated as before to be riskless. In each case, we maintain the same expected value (across
the three states) of monetary endowments, varying only the spread between the realisation in
the good and bad states. Table 5 summarises the results.
Table 5: Comparative Statics: Changes in risk profile
eγ1,H 27.375 27.4375 27.5 27.5625 27.625
eγ2,H 27 27 27 27 27
eγ3,H 21 20 19 18 17
ξ1 5 5 5 5 5
ξ2 -10 -10 -10 -10 -10
C 1 1 1 1 1
α∗CB(B) 0.4201 0.3625 0.3050 0.2476 0.1903
α∗γ(D) 0.2105 0.2103 0.2102 0.2100 0.2099
In the above exercise, the payoff function of the LoLR remains the same. We find that as the
riskiness of the high risk profile increases i.e. as we move from left to right in the table above, the
equilibrium mixed strategy of the two players changes in two ways – the equilibrium probability
that the LoLR adopts a doveish stance ex ante decreases, and the equilibrium probability that
the bank choses the risky profile also slightly decreases. This is because an increase in the
riskiness of the high risk profile implies an increased monetary endowment in the good state.
Under this profile, it defaults in the bad state and is either bailed out or not. Either way, since
it defaults, it does not bear the full costs of a reduced endowment in the bad state and therefore
an increase in the riskiness of the high risk profile serves to increase the bank’s expected profit.
This makes the action to choose the high risk profile (i.e. action D) more attractive to the bank,
though not enough to dominate the ND option. This increase in the bank’s preference for the
high risk profile is countered by a decrease in α∗CB(B), the equilibrium probability with which
the LoLR plays B (an ex ante doveish stance), since NB is the LoLR’s best response to the bank
playing D. Further, we find that the expected aggregate level of default is not very strongly
influenced by an increase in the riskiness of the high risk profile. Therefore on the whole, given
that the bank profitability increases and aggregate default does not change significantly, the
LoLR’s payoff also increases under the action D. This serves to slightly decrease the equilibrium
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value of α∗γ(D), the equilibrium probability of the bank adopting a high risk profile.
Therefore we find that an increase in the riskiness of the high risk profile serves to reduce
the equilibrium probability of an ex ante doveish stance, and also (through the specification of
the payoff function of the LoLR) seems to deter risk taking behaviour by the bank.
5.2 Changes in the payoff function of the LoLR
Here, we study the effects of changes in the parameters of the payoff function of the lender of
last resort on the equilibrium of the strategic game. Unlike in the case above, in this exercise,
changing the parameters of the payoff function of the LoLR does not change the values of the
endogenous variables obtained in the different monetary equilibria. This is because in each of
the monetary equilibria, agents already know what strategic choices both players have made
by the time they make their own decisions on consumption, borrowing, and repayment. Since
the payoff of the commercial bank is determined purely by the endogenous variables of the
respective monetary equilibria, changing the parameters of the LoLR’s payoff function does not
affect the payoffs of the commercial bank for each combination of actions in the strategic game.
There is therefore no change in the equilibrium mixed strategy of the LoLR. However, since the
equilibrium mixed strategy of the commercial bank is dependent on the payoffs of the LoLR, we
find that changes in these parameters affect the equilibrium strategy of the commercial bank.
Table 6 summarises the results.
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Table 6: Comparative Statics: Changes in LoLR payoff function
eγ1,H 27.5 27.5 27.5 27.5 27.5
eγ2,H 27 27 27 27 27
eγ3,H 19 19 19 19 19
ξ1 0 2.5 5 10 20
ξ2 -10 -10 -10 -10 -10
C 1 1 1 1 1
α∗CB(B) 0.3050 0.3050 0.3050 0.3050 0.3050
α∗γ(D) 0.5247 0.3001 0.2102 0.1314 0.0751
ξ1 5 5 5 5 5
ξ2 0 -5 -10 -50 -100
C 1 1 1 1 1
α∗CB(B) 0.3050 0.3050 0.3050 0.3050 0.3050
α∗γ(D) 0.2061 0.2081 0.2102 0.2283 0.2558
ξ1 5 5 5 5 5
ξ2 -10 -10 -10 -10 -10
C .5 .75 1 1.25 1.5
α∗CB(B) 0.3050 0.3050 0.3050 0.3050 0.3050
α∗γ(D) 0.3153 0.2627 0.2102 0.1576 0.1051
The first part of Table 6 illustrates the effects of a change in the parameter ξ1 on the
equilibrium mixed strategy of the bank. An increase in ξ1, increases the relative importance of
bank profitability in the payoff function of the LoLR. As bank profitability becomes relatively
more important this makes the NB strategy more attractive to the LoLR, but not enough to
dominate B. This in turn reduces the equilibrium probability of the bank choosing a high risk
profile since ND is the bank’s best response to the LoLR playing NB.
In the second part of the table, we change the value of the parameter ξ2 thereby increasing
the relative importance of default on the LoLR’s payoff. Here we see that an increase in the
relative importance of the aggregate level of default to the LoLR brings about an increase in
the equilibrium probability of the bank choosing a high risk profile. This is akin to the ‘too
big to fail’ problem. The greater the perceived spillover effects of a bank’s failure are, the
more it can hold the LoLR to ransom and pile on risk. Here, the more important (reducing)
default becomes to the LoLR, the more attractive the strategy B becomes to it. Since, D is the
bank’s best response to the LoLR playing B, we therefore observe an increase in the equilibrium
probability of the bank choosing a high risk profile.
Finally, the last part of Table 6 studies the effects of changes in the perceived costs,17 C , of
17These include monetary costs borne by the taxpayer, as well as other non-monetary and political costs.
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opting for a doveish stance ex ante. We find, intuitively, that as the perceived costs of a bailout
increase, all else remaining constant, the LoLR prefers taking a hawkish stance ex ante. This
results in the bank reducing its equilibrium probability of choosing a high risk profile since ND
is the bank’s best response to NB.
6 Conclusion
This paper aimed to model the role of the lender of last resort in a general equilibrium frame-
work. To this end we modelled a strategic (simultaneous) game between a bank and the lender
of last resort with the bank choosing between high and low (exogenous) risk profiles, and the
LoLR choosing to adopt either a hawkish or a doveish stance with respect to bailing banks
out in bad states of nature. The strategic choices of the players affect the budget sets of all
agents in the exchange economy and therefore influence the (competitive) monetary equilibrium
attained. This in turn influences the payoffs of the two players – the bank and the LoLR – and
determines the strategic equilibrium of the game.
Using a suitable parametrisation of the model, we find that there exists no pure strategy
equilibrium in the game. The unique Nash equilibrium of the game is one of mixed strategies
with the LoLR committing ex ante to a strategy of bailing out banks in some cases, and not
in other cases. We take this mixed strategy Nash equilibrium to be a rationalisation of the
policy of constructive ambiguity. Our comparative statics exercises show that the existence
(and uniqueness) of the mixed strategy equilibrium is robust to a wide range of parameter
values and we also find evidence of behaviour akin to the ‘too big to fail problem’ in our model.
While this basic model provides us with useful insights, it also opens up several avenues
for extension and further study. The bank’s risk profile is in this model exogenous to the
equilibrium studied and the choice of risk profile currently stems purely from the payoffs of the
strategic game. Moral hazard is therefore in a sense exogenously built into the model.18 Fully
endogenising the choice of risk profile is a non-trivial task but one that would allow for richer
inferences to be made. The current two-period model could be extended to a three-period setup
with a Diamond and Dybvig (1983) style problem requiring intermediate injections of liquidity
in bad states of nature. Kashyap et al. (2014, 2017) use such a setup to study the effects of
different macro-prudential regulations on credit creation, risk taking, and agents’ welfare. A
similar analysis could be conducted for LoLR policy and intervention. Further, one could also
study the design of an optimal contract between banks and the LoLR in the spirit of Townsend
(1979) and Mookherjee and Png (1989). Another possible extension would be to set up a
dynamic version of the model and study the equilibrium of a repeated strategic game between
banks and the LoLR.
18There is an endogenous element too, since the strategic choices of the bank and LoLR affect the payoffs of
the players through their influence on the budget sets of all agents and equilibrium values of prices and decision
variables.
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Appendix
6.1 First order conditions
Household α
(01α) ∂L/∂qα0 : u′ (eα0 − qα0 )− p0ψα02 = 0
(02α) ∂L/∂bα1 : θ1u′
(
eα1 +
bα1
p1
)
− p1ψα11 = 0
(03α) ∂L/∂bα2 : θ2u′
(
eα2 +
bα2
p2
)
− p2ψα21 = 0
(04α) ∂L/∂bα3 : θ3u′
(
eα3 +
bα3
p3
)
− p3ψα31 = 0
(05α) ∂L/∂dα : ψα01 − (1 + rd) {νγ1ψα11 + νγ2ψα21 + νγ3ψα31} = 0
(06α) ∂L/∂µα0 : −λ0 (1− να0 ) +
ψα01
1 + r0
− να0 ψα02 = 0
(07α) ∂L/∂να0 : (λ0 − ψα02)µα0 = 0
(08α) ∂L/∂ψα01 : dα −
µα0
1 + r0
−mα0 = 0
(09α) ∂L/∂ψα02 : µα0να0 − p0qα0 = 0
(10α) ∂L/∂ψα11 : bα1 − dα(1 + rd)νγ1 −mα1 = 0
(11α) ∂L/∂ψα21 : bα2 − dα(1 + rd)νγ2 −mα2 = 0
(12α) ∂L/∂ψα31 : bα3 − dα(1 + rd)νγ3 −mα3 = 0
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Household β
(01β) ∂L/∂bβ0 : u′
(
eβ0 +
bβ0
p0
)
− p0ψβ01 = 0
(02β) ∂L/∂qβ1 : θ1u′
(
eβ1 − qβ1
)
− p1ψβ12 = 0
(03β) ∂L/∂qβ2 : θ2u′
(
eβ2 − qβ2
)
− p2ψβ22 = 0
(04β) ∂L/∂qβ3 : θ3u′
(
eβ3 − qβ3
)
− p3ψβ32 = 0
(05β) ∂L/∂µ¯β : −θ1λ¯1(1− ν¯β1 )− θ2λ¯2(1− ν¯β2 )− θ3λ¯3(1− ν¯β3 ) +
ψβ01
1 + r¯
− ν¯β1ψβ11 − ν¯β2ψβ21 − ν¯β3ψβ31 = 0
(06β) ∂L/∂µβ1 : −θ1λ1(1− νβ1 ) +
ψβ11
(1 + r1)
− νβ1ψβ12 = 0
(07β) ∂L/∂µβ2 : −θ2λ2(1− νβ2 ) +
ψβ21
(1 + r2)
− νβ1ψβ22 = 0
(08β) ∂L/∂µβ3 : −θ3λ3(1− νβ3 ) +
ψβ31
(1 + r3)
− νβ1ψβ32 = 0
(09β) ∂L/∂ν¯β1 : (θ1λ¯1 − ψβ11)µ¯β = 0
(10β) ∂L/∂ν¯β2 : (θ2λ¯2 − ψβ21)µ¯β = 0
(11β) ∂L/∂ν¯β3 : (θ3λ¯3 − ψβ31)µ¯β = 0
(12β) ∂L/∂νβ1 : (θ1λ1 − ψβ11)µβ1 = 0
(13β) ∂L/∂νβ2 : (θ2λ2 − ψβ21)µβ2 = 0
(14β) ∂L/∂νβ3 : (θ3λ3 − ψβ31)µβ3 = 0
(15β) ∂L/∂ψβ01 : bβ0 −
µ¯β
1 + r¯ −m
β
0 = 0
(16β) ∂L/∂ψβ11 : µ¯β ν¯β1 −
µβ1
1 + r1
−mβ1 = 0
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(17β) ∂L/∂ψβ12 : µβ1νβ1 − p1qβ1 = 0
(18β) ∂L/∂ψβ21 : µ¯β ν¯β2 −
µβ2
1 + r2
−mβ2 = 0
(19β) ∂L/∂ψβ22 : µβ2νβ2 − p2qβ2 = 0
(20β) ∂L/∂ψβ31 : µ¯β ν¯β3 −
µβ3
1 + r3
−mβ3 = 0
(21β) ∂L/∂ψβ32 : µβ3νβ3 − p3qβ3 = 0
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Bank γ, ND
(01γND) ∂L/∂piγ0 : 1− 2cγpiγ0 − ψγ02 = 0
(02γND) ∂L/∂mγ0 : ψγ01 − (1 + r0)να0 ψγ02 = 0
(03γND) ∂L/∂mγ1 : θ1
{
1− 2cγmγ1(1 + r1)νβ1
}
(1 + r1)νβ1 − ψγ11 = 0
(04γND) ∂L/∂mγ2 : θ2
{
1− 2cγmγ2(1 + r2)νβ2
}
(1 + r2)νβ2 − ψγ21 = 0
(05γND) ∂L/∂mγ3 : θ3
{
1− 2cγmγ3(1 + r3)νβ3
}
(1 + r3)νβ3 − ψγ31 = 0
(06γND) ∂L/∂m¯γ : ψγ01 − (1 + r¯)
{
ν¯β1ψ
γ
11 + ν¯β2ψγ21 + ν¯β3ψγ31
}
= 0
(07γND) ∂L/∂µγR : ψγ01 − (1 + ρ) {ψγ11 + ψγ21 + ψγ31} = 0
(08γND) ∂L/∂µγd : −θ1λd1(1− νγ1 )− θ2λd2(1− νγ2 )− θ3λd3(1− νγ3 ) +
ψγ01
1 + rd
− νγ1ψγ11 − νγ2ψγ21 − νγ3ψγ31 = 0
(09γND) ∂L/∂νγ1 :
(
θ1λ
d
1 − ψγ11
)
µγd = 0
(10γND) ∂L/∂νγ2 :
(
θ2λ
d
2 − ψγ21
)
µγd = 0
(11γND) ∂L/∂νγ3 :
(
θ3λ
d
3 − ψγ31
)
µγd = 0
(12γND) ∂L/∂cγ0 : ψγ02 − {ψγ11 + ψγ21 + ψγ31} = 0
(13γND) ∂L/∂ψγ01 : mγ0 + m¯γ −
µγd
1 + rd
− µ
γ
R
1 + ρ − e
γ
0 = 0
(14γND) ∂L/∂ψγ02 : piγ0 + cγ0 −mγ0(1 + r0)να0 = 0
(15γND) ∂L/∂ψγ11 : mγ1 + µγdνγ1 + µγR − cγ0 − m¯γ(1 + r¯)ν¯β1 − eγ1 = 0
(16γND) ∂L/∂ψγ21 : mγ2 + µγdνγ2 + µγR − cγ0 − m¯γ(1 + r¯)ν¯β2 − eγ2 = 0
(17γND) ∂L/∂ψγ31 : mγ3 + µγdνγ3 + µγR − cγ0 − m¯γ(1 + r¯)ν¯β3 − eγ3 = 0
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Bank γ, DB
(01γDB) ∂L/∂piγ0 : 1− 2cγpiγ0 − ψγ02 = 0
(02γDB) ∂L/∂mγ0 : ψγ01 − (1 + r0)να0 ψγ02 = 0
(03γDB) ∂L/∂mγ1 : θ1
{
1− 2cγmγ1(1 + r1)νβ1
}
(1 + r1)νβ1 − ψγ11 = 0
(04γDB) ∂L/∂mγ2 : θ2
{
1− 2cγmγ2(1 + r2)νβ2
}
(1 + r2)νβ2 − ψγ21 = 0
(05γDB) ∂L/∂mγ3 : θ3
{
1− 2cγ
(
mγ3(1 + r3)νβ3 − µγB
)}
(1 + r3)νβ3 − ψγ31 = 0
(06γDB) ∂L/∂m¯γ : ψγ01 − (1 + r¯)
{
ν¯β1ψ
γ
11 + ν¯β2ψγ21 + ν¯β3ψγ31
}
= 0
(07γDB) ∂L/∂µγR : ψγ01 − (1 + ρ) {ψγ11 + ψγ21} = 0
(08γDB) ∂L/∂µγd : −θ1λd1(1− νγ1 )− θ2λd2(1− νγ2 )− θ3λd3(1− νγ3 ) +
ψγ01
1 + rd
− νγ1ψγ11 − νγ2ψγ21 − νγ3ψγ31 = 0
(09γDB) ∂L/∂νγ1 :
(
θ1λ
d
1 − ψγ11
)
µγd = 0
(10γDB) ∂L/∂νγ2 :
(
θ2λ
d
2 − ψγ21
)
µγd = 0
(11γDB) ∂L/∂νγ3 :
(
θ3λ
d
3 − ψγ31
)
µγd = 0
(12γDB) ∂L/∂cγ0 : ψγ02 − {ψγ11 + ψγ21 + ψγ31} = 0
(13γDB) ∂L/∂ψγ01 : mγ0 + m¯γ −
µγd
1 + rd
− µ
γ
R
1 + ρ − e
γ
0 = 0
(14γDB) ∂L/∂ψγ02 : piγ0 + cγ0 −mγ0(1 + r0)να0 = 0
(15γDB) ∂L/∂ψγ11 : mγ1 + µγdνγ1 + µγR − cγ0 − m¯γ(1 + r¯)ν¯β1 − eγ1 = 0
(16γDB) ∂L/∂ψγ21 : mγ2 + µγdνγ2 + µγR − cγ0 − m¯γ(1 + r¯)ν¯β2 − eγ2 = 0
(17γDB) ∂L/∂ψγ31 : mγ3 + µγdνγ3 − cγ0 − m¯γ(1 + r¯)ν¯β3 −
µγB
1 + τ = 0
(18γDB) ∂L/∂µγB : θ3
{
1− 2cγ
(
mγ3(1 + r3)νβ3 − µγB
)}
− ψ
γ
31
1 + τ = 0
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Bank γ, DN
(01γDN) ∂L/∂piγ0 : 1− 2cγpiγ0 − ψγ02 = 0
(02γDN) ∂L/∂mγ0 : ψγ01 − (1 + r0)να0 ψγ02 = 0
(03γDN) ∂L/∂mγ1 : θ1
{
1− 2cγmγ1(1 + r1)νβ1
}
(1 + r1)νβ1 − ψγ11 = 0
(04γDN) ∂L/∂mγ2 : θ2
{
1− 2cγmγ2(1 + r2)νβ2
}
(1 + r2)νβ2 − ψγ21 = 0
(05γDN) ∂L/∂m¯γ : ψγ01 − (1 + r¯)
{
ν¯β1ψ
γ
11 + ν¯β2ψγ21
}
= 0
(06γDN) ∂L/∂µγR : ψγ01 − (1 + ρ) {ψγ11 + ψγ21} = 0
(07γDN) ∂L/∂µγd : −θ1λd1(1− νγ1 )− θ2λd2(1− νγ2 ) +
ψγ01
1 + rd
− νγ1ψγ11 − νγ2ψγ21 = 0
(08γDN) ∂L/∂νγ1 :
(
θ1λ
d
1 − ψγ11
)
µγd = 0
(09γDN) ∂L/∂νγ2 :
(
θ2λ
d
2 − ψγ21
)
µγd = 0
(10γDN) ∂L/∂cγ0 : ψγ02 − {ψγ11 + ψγ21} = 0
(11γDN) ∂L/∂ψγ01 : mγ0 + m¯γ −
µγd
1 + rd
− µ
γ
R
1 + ρ − e
γ
0 = 0
(12γDN) ∂L/∂ψγ02 : piγ0 + cγ0 −mγ0(1 + r0)να0 = 0
(13γDN) ∂L/∂ψγ11 : mγ1 + µγdνγ1 + µγR − cγ0 − m¯γ(1 + r¯)ν¯β1 − eγ1 = 0
(14γDN) ∂L/∂ψγ21 : mγ2 + µγdνγ2 + µγR − cγ0 − m¯γ(1 + r¯)ν¯β2 − eγ2 = 0
Additionally, we have νγ3 =
cγ0 + m¯γ(1 + r¯)ν¯β3
µγd
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6.2 Numerical solutions: Computation residuals
No Default equilibrium (ND)
Figure 7: Computation residuals, ND equilibrium
The No Default (ND) equilibrium calibration is the solution of a system of 61 simulta-
neous equations in 61 variables19, fi (xi) = 0, for i = 1, 2, . . . , 61. The computation resid-
uals of the equations are shown as blue stars.20 As |fi| ≤ 10−14 ∀i, and min (xi) > 10−4,
the equilibrium solution is reasonably stable.
1933 endogenous choice variables, 11 prices, and 17 Lagrange multipliers.
20A missing blue star corresponds to a residual of 0.
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Default & Bailout equilibrium (DB)
Figure 8: Computation residuals, DB equilibrium
The Default & Bailout (DB) equilibrium calibration is the solution of a system of 62
simultaneous equations in 62 variables21, fi (xi) = 0, for i = 1, 2, . . . , 62. The computation
residuals of the equations are shown as blue stars.22 As |fi| ≤ 10−14 ∀i, and min (xi) >
10−4, the equilibrium solution is reasonably stable.
2134 endogenous choice variables, 11 prices, and 17 Lagrange multipliers.
22A missing blue star corresponds to a residual of 0.
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Default & No Bailout equilibrium (DN)
Figure 9: Computation residuals, DN equilibrium
The Default & No Bailout (DN) equilibrium calibration is the solution of a system
of 58 simultaneous equations in 58 variables23, fi (xi) = 0, for i = 1, 2, . . . , 58. The
computation residuals of the equations are shown as blue stars.24 As |fi| ≤ 10−13 ∀i,
and min (xi) ≈ 10−4, the equilibrium solution is reasonably stable.
2331 endogenous choice variables, 11 prices, and 16 Lagrange multipliers.
24A missing blue star corresponds to a residual of 0.
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